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Abstract. 
This investigation delineates a multi-year action research agenda de-
signed to develop an instructional model for teaching the nature of sci-
ence (NOS) to preservice science teachers. Our past research strongly 
supports the use of explicit reflective instructional methods, which in-
cludes Thomas Kuhn’s notion of learning by ostention and treating sci-
ence as a continuum (i.e., comparing fields of study to one another for 
relative placement as less to more scientific). Instruction based on con-
ceptual change precepts, however, also exhibits promise. Thus, the in-
vestigators sought to ascertain the degree to which conceptual change 
took place among students (n=15) participating in the NOS instructional 
model. Three case studies are presented to illustrate successful concep-
tual changes that took place as a result of the NOS instructional model. 
All three cases represent students who claim a very conservative Chris-
tian heritage and for whom evolution was not considered a legitimate sci-
entific theory prior to participating in the NOS instructional model. All 
three case study individuals, along with their twelve classmates, placed 
evolution as most scientific when compared to intelligent design and a 
fictional field of study called “Umbrellaology.” 
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1. Introduction 
Identifying effective means for teaching the nature of science (NOS) 
has become a central focus for science education in recent years. Stud-
ies have shown that, among children, adults, science teachers, and 
even scientists, an understanding of the NOS is meager at best. For ex-
ample, 70% of the American adult respondents to the 2001 National 
Science Board Survey of Public Attitudes Toward and Understanding 
of Science and Technology did not hold an adequate “understanding 
of the scientific process” (National Science Board 2002). Sixty per-
cent of the American NSB respondents agreed that some people pos-
sess psychic powers or ESP. In a Gallup poll of Americans more than 
30% reported beliefs in telepathy, extraterrestrial visitation, clairvoy-
ance, and haunted houses (Newport and Strausberg 2001). Belief in 
astrology and the paranormal is even higher among Europeans (Eu-
ropean Commission 2001). Effective arguments have been made on 
economic, utilitarian, democratic, cultural, and even moral grounds 
supporting the claim that functioning in a modern society requires a 
minimal level of understanding of the NOS (Driver et al. 1996, p. 11; 
see also McComas et al. 1998). Ongoing arguments over questions in-
volved in the place of “equal time” for intelligent design and evolu-
tion in the biology classroom, the health risks of consuming geneti-
cally modified fruits and vegetables, and the collection, study and use 
of embryonic stem cells highlight the importance of NOS understand-
ing. Recognizing the validity of these arguments, recent national stan-
dards documents adopted in different countries have included NOS 
understanding as a central theme refocusing both classroom teachers 
and science education researchers on questions about how this goal 
can be accomplished. 
Crucial considerations to be addressed before research can be de-
signed to answer this question include: What NOS should be taught? 
Or Whose NOS? Which aspects should be included? Alters (1997) and 
others have demonstrated diversity in descriptions of the NOS among 
philosophers of science, but others have argued that there is a remark-
able consensus about the NOS at the level appropriate to members of 
the general population (Smith et al. 1997). The national standards doc-
uments reflect this consensus, presenting some 14 similar or identi-
cal NOS concepts (McComas et al. 1998). These concepts (or subsets 
of them) must therefore be the focus of our instructional programs. 
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Science educators have also argued that it is self-evident that sci-
ence teachers who teach the NOS must have an adequate NOS under-
standing themselves. Even when NOS is not a direct goal of teach-
ing, the structure of the instruction likely sends implicit messages 
about the NOS (e.g., teaching mountains of “facts” sends the mes-
sage that science is unchanging, not tentative). Studies of both pre-
service and in-service teachers, however, have largely revealed woe-
fully inadequate levels of NOS understanding (Abd-El-Khalick and 
Lederman 2000). Therefore, before NOS instruction can focus on sci-
ence students, it must focus on science teachers themselves. This in-
struction must not only provide teachers with the pedagogical content 
knowledge needed to teach the NOS but also promote advancement in 
teacher understanding of the NOS. 
Early attempts at NOS instruction met with limited success 
(Palmquist and Finley 1997; Lederman 1999; Abd-El-Khalick and 
Lederman 2000). These studies supported the anecdotal experience 
of classroom teachers, even in cases where the instructor has an in-
formed understanding of the NOS, that student learning of the NOS 
is typically very difficult to achieve. Research has identified a host of 
naïve and improper conceptions of science held by individuals in var-
ious study populations. 
2. Naive Understandings of the NOS 
A large number of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method stud-
ies have supported three central claims about NOS understanding 
among both students and pre-service and in-service teachers. First, 
most people have inadequate understandings of the NOS (for review, 
see McComas et al. 1998). Three useful rubrics for analyzing NOS 
understandings have been developed. Lederman and colleagues dis-
tinguish between “naive” and “informed” NOS understandings (Ak-
erson et al. 2000). Carey and colleagues (Carey et al. 1989; Carey 
and Smith 1993; Smith et al. 2000) proposed a three-level categori-
zation scheme: Level 1 epistemology (lowest) – experimental results 
are seen as answers themselves, not as evidence for or against a par-
ticular idea; Level 2 epistemology – the purpose of science is to test 
ideas, but tentativeness or social construction of science are not un-
derstood; Level 3 epistemology – consistent with modern views of the 
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NOS. The National Science Board (1996) used a 4-level scheme: Level 
I (highest) – understand that science involves developing and testing 
theories; Level II – do not understand this purpose of science but do 
recognize that experiments require control groups; Level III – lack the 
higher levels of understanding but recognize that science is based on 
careful and rigorous comparisons with precise measurements; Level 
IV – lack the above understandings. (Only 2% of the 1995 American 
respondents held the highest level of science understanding.) Our own 
position is that understandings of the NOS change incrementally such 
that individuals at any given point in time fall along a continuum from 
more naïve to more well informed (Smith and Scharmann 1999). This 
position is most consistent with that of Eugenie Scott (1999). 
Second, alternative conceptions that are inconsistent with currently 
accepted understanding of the NOS are commonly held. Individuals 
often hold that scientific conclusions are “truth,” that science can be 
used to answer all questions, that supported theories become laws, 
that science provides “absolute proof,” etc. (For a concise summary of 
common naive conceptions, see McComas 1996). Based on these find-
ings, Khishfe and Abd-El-Khalick (2002) have proposed that the ques-
tion of how to effectively facilitate NOS learning should be couched 
in terms of conceptual change theory. (See also Abd-El-Khalick and 
Akerson 2004). 
Third, understanding of the NOS is often incoherent and frag-
mented. Student understandings of the NOS are best understood as 
components of conceptual frameworks that are not well organized and 
integrated with each other and may actually conflict with each other 
or with the resident cognitive structure. An individual may, for ex-
ample, hold an informed view of the tentativeness of science but con-
currently hold naïve views of the kinds of questions science can and 
cannot be used to answer. Similarly, it has long been recognized that 
individuals may “play the game of science” well in the classroom while 
holding conflicting personal views of science. Furthermore, individu-
als may be completely unaware of their conflicting views or may ra-
tionalize that no conflict exists (Gilbert et al. 1982). Although these 
findings are not incompatible with calls for viewing NOS instruction 
as a conceptual change problem, conceptual change theorists typi-
cally view the individual’s understanding of a concept as a less frag-
mented, more integrated whole. They generally consider the difficulty 
of any learning that requires discarding an alternative conception to 
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be a function of how deeply integrated that misconception is within 
the individual’s conceptual ecology (Hewson et al. 1998). 
Others have argued that it may be fruitful to view the problem of 
NOS learning as one of cultural “border crossing” (Aikenhead and Jegede 
1999). In this view many students experience science as a “culture” that 
is not only distinct from their out-of-school culture but may also be so 
“discordant” with their personal worldviews that adopting a scientific 
view of the world (or view of science itself at least) feels “hazardous,” 
jeopardizes the student’s self-esteem, threatens his ego, and may cause 
“psychological pain.” Aikenhead and Jegede described, for example, a 
student whose personal faith was so “heavily influenced by his fire and 
brimstone home microculture” that crossing the border into school sci-
ence was impossible (p. 281). The emotional and psychological risk was 
simply too great. We are familiar with such students for whom consid-
ering the possibility that science may not of necessity conflict with re-
ligion threatens their foundational image of themselves as believers. 
According to Aikenhead and Jegede (1999), science instruction that 
accounts for such students must encourage “flexibility and feeling 
at ease.” “Flexibility can best be achieved by an attitude ... Lugones 
(1987) described as ‘playful” (p. 273). We think of flexibility/playful-
ness as the ability to “try it on, to see how it feels,” to see if this view 
might make sense without making a personal investment of any kind 
in the new view and not rejecting any personally held commitments. 
This is, for example, the ability required of a student who is asked to 
argue for a position he does not hold in an effort to enhance that stu-
dent’s understanding of that position. This concept goes hand in hand 
with that of “feeling at ease.” “Ease is conceived as a cluster of factors: 
(a) being a fluent speaker, (b) agreeing with the norms of that culture, 
(c) being humanly bonded with people in that culture, and (d) hav-
ing a sense of shared history” (p. 273). Indeed, a substantial number 
of our students have grave difficulty using scientific terms appropri-
ately, patently disavow the norms of scientists (or have at least been 
encouraged by their ministers to do so), have never known a scien-
tist, and have no sense of shared history with scientists. For at least 
some students, then, the issue may not be limited to the fact that un-
derstanding the philosophy underlying the NOS is so cognitively chal-
lenging or that they harbor tenaciously held alternative conceptions. 
From this view, these students also enter our classrooms ill at ease 
and fearing that their basic precepts will be challenged. 
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3. NOS Instruction 
Taking into consideration these findings about student understand-
ing of the NOS, several different approaches for teaching the NOS 
have been developed. (For reviews, see Lederman 1992; Lederman 
and Abd-El-Khalick 1998; Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman 2000; Kh-
ishfe and Abd-El-Khalick 2002). McComas et al. (1998) identify four 
approaches to NOS instruction based on where the instruction is sit-
uated: within methods courses, within science content classes, within 
authentic science experiences (e.g., internships in research laborato-
ries), and within self-contained NOS courses or units. In large part, 
we hold most claims for any one of these approaches and against the 
others to be straw-man arguments. We share the view of McComas et 
al. (1998) and others that NOS understanding may best be enhanced 
when students learn informed views of the NOS, not just in one class, 
but when they encounter mutually consistent views of the NOS across 
more than one setting. 
Alternatively, Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman (2000) distinguish be-
tween implicit and explicit approaches to NOS instruction: Implicit 
NOS instruction assumes that students can learn the NOS by “doing 
science.” Students engage in science-based activities, but NOS issues 
are not specifically addressed. In contrast, explicit NOS instruction 
takes NOS learning to be a direct target, not a side effect of the learn-
ing experience. Aspects of the NOS are directly addressed with stu-
dents. In keeping with a constructivist view of learning, explicit in-
struction has typically included extensive opportunities for students 
to reflect on their understandings of the NOS and how the readings, 
lectures, or other learning activities impact those understandings. Ac-
cording to Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman (2000), the difference be-
tween the two types of instruction 
lies in the extent to which learners are provided (or helped 
to come to grips) with the conceptual tools, such as some 
key aspects of NOS, that would enable them to think about 
and reflect on the activities in which they are encouraged 
(p. 690). 
Although there has been no research to date directly comparing 
the two modes of NOS instruction in a single study, the weight of the 
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available evidence from numerous studies of programs that employed 
one or the other clearly favors explicit reflective NOS instruction over 
the relatively ineffective implicit mode for developing NOS under-
standing (Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman 2000). 
Research studies have employed a wide variety of materials and 
methods for use in explicit reflective NOS instruction, including re-
flective journal writing, small and/or large group lectures and discus-
sions, teacher questioning, science-embedded activities, card sorts/
card exchange games using NOS concepts, concept mapping, analy-
sis of critical and typical teaching incidents, presentations by visiting 
expert speakers (scientists, philosophers, historians of science, class-
room teachers who teach NOS, etc.), debates, readings, videos, devel-
oping lesson plans that address both science content and NOS, histor-
ical case studies, and comparing positions of philosophers, historians, 
and sociologists of science. (An excellent guide to the use of many of 
these materials is available. See McComas 1996.) 
The primary question arising from this literature, of course, is: 
How effective have these attempts been at promoting an informed un-
derstanding of the NOS among students? After an extensive review of 
the literature, Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman (2000) concluded that 
instruction as reported in these studies has been largely unsuccess-
ful. Gains in the experimental groups, when statistically significant, 
were often so small as to be of little practical significance. Also, be-
cause pretreatment understandings were so low, the relatively small 
gains obtained represent NOS understandings that are still unsatis-
factorily limited. 
A promising approach is the recent work of Abd-El-Khalick, Leder-
man and colleagues (Akerson et al. 2000; Abd-El-Khalick and Akerson 
2004) who have studied the effects of an explicit reflective NOS instruc-
tional program for pre-service elementary teachers that is also based on 
the Hewson et al. (1998) guidelines for promoting conceptual change. 
Although this work has not included control groups, mean gain scores 
in the range of 24–68% and absolute post-instructional mean scores of 
69–82% (on various NOS aspects) are clearly of practical significance. 
In summary, research to date strongly supports the use of explicit 
reflective instructional methods for NOS instruction but the practical 
success of instructional programs has been minimal. Instruction based 
on conceptual change precepts shows promise, but there still appears 
to be a need for effective approaches to NOS instruction, for which it 
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may be valuable to seek guidance from other sources. We have found 
the following work to be particularly instructive. 
4. Teaching and Learning by Ostention 
4.1. Kuhn and Ostention 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) argued that 
the history of science is best characterized as periods of “normal sci-
ence” interrupted by periods of “revolutionary science” when old “par-
adigms” are replaced by new ones. According to Kuhn, scientists come 
to understand and share these paradigms by ostention. Defining a con-
cept by ostention simply means clarifying “the meaning of the term 
by pointing to examples of things to which it applies” (Bonevac 1999). 
Thus, Kuhn would maintain that scientists recognize a new research 
question as acceptable by comparison with paradigmatic examples of 
related acceptable questions. (For a review of Kuhn’s views on osten-
tion, see Andersen 2000). 
Kuhn argued that ostention is the primary mechanism by which 
children learn the concept labels for natural families of objects in ev-
eryday life. Kuhn’s primary example was a child learning to distin-
guish ducks, geese, and swans (Kuhn 1974). Kuhn described a hypo-
thetical situation in which Johnny learns to identify these waterfowl 
during a walk in a zoological garden with his father. Essentially, John-
ny’s father points out examples of each type of bird and Johnny at-
tempts to identify each new bird they encounter. Sometimes he is 
right, sometimes he is wrong. “After a few more such encounters, 
however, each with its appropriate correction or reinforcement, John-
ny’s ability to identify these waterfowl is as great as his father’s” 
(Kuhn 1974, p. 309). Understandings of categories such as “duck,” 
“goose,” and “swan” are therefore “transmitted from one generation 
to the next solely by extracting similarity relations from the exemplars 
on exhibit” (Andersen 2000). Kuhn’s point is that children typically 
learn concept labels by exposure to examples in each category, not 
by learning lists of concept characteristics. “Anyone who has taught 
a child under such circumstances knows that the primary pedagogic 
tool is ostention. Phrases like ‘all swans are white’ may play a role, 
but they need not” (Kuhn 1974, p. 309). 
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Philosophers may recognize that Kuhn’s ideas about learning con-
cepts that are difficult to explicitly define are based on Wittgenstein’s 
analysis of the concept “games.” (Think for example about a definition 
that would include solitaire, chess, and the children’s game of “duck, 
duck, goose.”) Kuhn argued that, in practice, people come to under-
stand the term “games” by ostention, by experience with examples 
and counterexamples of the term. He maintained that “the end prod-
uct of the interaction between examples is nothing like a definition, a 
list of characteristics shared by games and only games, or of the fea-
tures common” (Kuhn 1979, p. 413). In other words, there is no list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions to delineate unequivocally things 
that are games from things that are not. Based on this analysis, we 
argue that, although philosophers and science educators may find it 
fruitful to argue over feature lists of scientific characteristics, teach-
ing the nature of science using such lists is likely to be less effective 
than beginning the instruction with prototypical examples. 
4.2. Contrasting Cases as Scaffolding for Learning 
The value of using contrasting cases to enhance learning (specif-
ically to prepare students with limited prior knowledge for learning 
from lectures or expository texts) has received strong empirical sup-
port in a set of studies conducted at the Learning Technology Center at 
Vanderbilt University. In those studies, Schwartz and Bransford (1998) 
demonstrated that “generating the distinctions between contrasting 
cases” before reading or listening in lectures resulted in greater un-
derstanding (as evidenced by performance on subsequent prediction 
tasks) compared to control treatments. Schwartz and Bransford ar-
gue that “analyzing contrasting cases increased students’ abilities to 
discern specific features that differentiated classes of ... phenomena” 
(p. 475). Furthermore, they argue that students engaged in this learn-
ing activity developed “the differentiated knowledge structures nec-
essary to understand a subsequent explanation at a deep level” (p. 
504). “One may think of these contrasting cases,” these researchers 
continue, “as a way to guide the students’ discovery of significant fea-
tures.” Contrasting cases, therefore, provide scaffolding for the learn-
ing that is to follow. 
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4.3. Learning Science and Scientific Concepts by Ostention 
Kuhn extended his arguments about the value of ostention in learn-
ing to the learning of scientific concepts as well: “If, for example, the 
student of Newtonian dynamics ever discovers the meaning of terms 
like “force,” “mass,” “space,” and “time,” he does so less from the in-
complete though sometimes helpful definitions in his text than by ob-
serving and participating in the application of these concepts to [a] 
problem solution” (Kuhn 1970, p. 47). “Students of physics regularly 
report that they have read through a chapter of their text, under-
stood it perfectly, but nonetheless had difficulty solving the problems 
... [As the student struggles with the problems, however, he/she] dis-
covers a way to see his problem as like a problem he has already en-
countered” (Kuhn 1974, p. 305). Research in problem solving has, in 
fact, clearly demonstrated that learning to recognize the “deep-struc-
ture” similarities among problems is central to the understanding re-
quired for successful problem-solving performance. For example, ex-
perts are much more likely to recognize that a given pair of problems 
are “Newton’s second law” problems, not “inclined plane” or “mov-
ing train” problems. Kuhn argues, however, that “it is after the simi-
larity has been seen that one may ask for criteria, and it is then often 
worth doing so” (Kuhn 1974, p. 308, emphasis added). 
Continuing his analysis of teaching the categorization of ducks, 
geese, and swans and of Wittgenstein’s “games,” Kuhn further argued 
that “most kind-terms [concept labels] must be learned as members 
of one or another contrast set” (Kuhn 1993, p. 371). In science, for ex-
ample, learning the meaning of the term “liquid” requires learning 
the meaning of the terms “solid” and “gas” as well because whenever 
one places a particular example in one category, one is also of neces-
sity not placing it in another. Kuhn continues, “Establishing the ref-
erent of a natural-kind [concept] requires exposure not only to varied 
members of that kind but also to members of others – to individuals, 
that is, to which the term might otherwise have been mistakenly ap-
plied” (Kuhn 1979, p. 413). Kuhn’s example of the child learning to dis-
tinguish ducks, geese, and swans is meant as an example of learning 
to distinguish such a set of categories that might easily be confused. 
Reflect for a moment on your own first understanding of the defi-
nition of the word “science”. For most of us, it is probably impossible 
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to remember when we first (if ever) learned an explicit definition. In-
stead, we are introduced to science by example – we take some “sci-
ence” classes and others that are in “non-science” departments. Few if 
any of those classes ever define “science” explicitly. Initially, we learn 
what science is mostly by ostention. Often it is only scholars who be-
come interested in the philosophy of science or in teaching the NOS 
who begin to think, read, and write about lists of the characteristics 
of science. Therefore “science” itself appears to be an example of a 
term that many science educators and presumably most scientists 
have come to understand initially by reference to examples. 
It is important to point out, however, that Kuhn did not argue that 
all science learning (including NOS) should be exclusively by osten-
tion – that there is no role for learning sets of accepted descriptors. 
Kuhn (1993) suggested that learning by ostention is most effective for 
the learning of natural families, i.e., contrasting sets between which 
there are clear discontinuities. The line of demarcation between sci-
ence and non-science has, of course, been an exceedingly difficult one 
for both philosophers and students to draw. Thus, we may expect that 
instruction that employs ostention may be a valuable adjunct to NOS 
instruction but is unlikely to provide a single direct avenue toward 
the goal of effective NOS teaching and learning. 
4.4. Ostention and Categorization Research 
Psychological research supports Kuhn’s perceptions (see Smith and 
Medlin 1981 for review). The body of categorization research strongly 
supports two general conclusions. First, 
rather than representing concepts by sets of defining crite-
ria, humans represent both natural and artificial concepts by 
a prototypical example. Category membership is determined 
by similarity or dissimilarity to the features of the prototype 
(Nersessian 1998, p. 96). 
Second, “Subjects overwhelmingly agree in their judgments of how 
good an example or clear case members are of a category, even for cat-
egories about whose boundaries they disagree” (Rosch 1978, p. 36). 
Thus, although there may be substantial disagreement over whether 
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creationism is or is not within the boundaries of science, there is likely 
wide agreement about the prototypes of science. One would assume, 
for example, that both creationists and evolutionists would tend to 
agree that physics (the “queen of the sciences”) is a prototypical sci-
ence. A side benefit of teaching that focuses on prototypical exam-
ples and counterexamples, therefore, may be that such instruction 
may help to avoid arguments about which list of NOS characteristics 
should be taught. 
4.5. Learning by Ostention and Concept Attainment 
The Kuhnian revolution and the cognitive revolution began 
at approximately the same time. There are notable connec-
tions among the problems with which each revolution was 
grappling, and with hindsight one can construct significant 
parallels between the views of knowledge, perception, and 
learning developed in each. However, by and large Thomas 
Kuhn never utilized research in the cognitive sciences that 
would have furthered his own paradigm in ways ... he would 
have found agreeable. (Nersessian 1998, p. 87) 
Although Kuhn may not have been in a position to make direct use 
of insights from the cognitive sciences, we are not so constrained. In 
their classic text Models of Teaching Joyce et al. (2004) delineate ad-
aptations of cognitive science research to teaching models. One such 
model, concept attainment, is adapted from the work of Jerome Bruner 
(Bruner et al. 1967). Concept attainment involves in part a “search for 
and listing of attributes that can be used to distinguish exemplars from 
nonexemplars” (Bruner et al. 1967, p. 233), and we acknowledge that 
this approach shares some features with Kuhnian ostention. Neither 
strategy, however, has previously been applied to NOS instruction. 
In summary, we conclude that humans often tend to learn diffi-
cult-to define concepts by ostention, that it may be fruitful to apply 
Kuhn’s ideas about ostention learning to learning about the NOS, and 
that ostention approaches may not be appropriate as the sole peda-
gogical avenue for NOS instruction. 
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5. A Proposed Instructional Approach to Teaching NOS by 
Ostention 
In recent years we have been engaged in the development of a pro-
gram for NOS instruction based on the following assumptions and 
claims drawn from the literature reviewed above: 
1. NOS instruction at the secondary and undergraduate levels (out-
side of history and philosophy of science classes) should focus 
on those aspects of the NOS commonly agreed upon in the sci-
ence education community (as set forth in the national standards 
documents). 
2. Pre-service (and in-service) science teaching methods courses 
should promote NOS understanding. We take it as a given that if 
science teachers are to present effective NOS instruction, they must 
have both informed understandings of the NOS themselves and 
pedagogical content knowledge about effective NOS instruction. 
3. NOS instruction is most likely to be effective if NOS concepts are 
addressed explicitly, not implicitly. 
4. NOS instruction is most likely to be effective when it requires 
active cognitive engagement with NOS issues and requiring that 
students reflect on current positions as well as changes in their 
understandings. 
5. NOS instruction is most likely to be effective if it employs concep-
tual change methodology, identifying common naïve conceptions 
held by the students; addressing these misconceptions directly; 
confronting situations in which present personal understandings 
are inadequate; discussing the intelligibility, plausibility, and fruit-
fulness of currently held and newly considered views of the NOS; 
and requiring justifications for judgments made (Hewson et al. 
1998). 
6. NOS instruction is most likely to be effective if it promotes inte-
gration of individual NOS concepts with each other as well as in-
tegration with in-school and out-of-school understandings of sci-
ence-related issues. 
7. The effectiveness of NOS instruction may be enhanced by pro-
moting learning by ostention, focusing first on prototypical ex-
amples and counterexamples, employing contrasting sets of these 
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examples, and sequencing these examples from most prototypical 
to borderline cases. 
8. The effectiveness of NOS instruction is likely to be enhanced if stu-
dents are asked to generate from these examples abstractions that 
can be used to compare science with non-science, as opposed to 
first presenting students with lectures and/or readings in which 
these abstractions are provided. 
9. The effectiveness of NOS instruction is likely to be enhanced if ev-
ery effort is made to ease the border crossing between the culture 
of school science and students’ everyday world, by focusing on 
flexibility/playfulness and putting students at ease. 
10. NOS instruction should use instructional models such as the learn-
ing cycle that have been shown to be effective in a broad range of 
other science content settings. 
In the following sections we will briefly describe early iterations 
of the course, followed by a more detailed description of the struc-
ture of the current course that explains how the ten tenets have been 
employed as a foundation for our NOS instruction over the past five 
years. This section closes with the presentation of three case studies 
that provide insight into the effects of the course. 
6. Development of an Instructional Protocol: Implementations 1–3 
The course that provides the context for this work is entitled “Labo-
ratory Techniques in the Teaching of Science” taught by the second au-
thor at a major research university in the American Midwest. Twelve 
hours of instruction are devoted to the NOS, which is one of the four 
major themes of the course. Students in the course include both grad-
uate and undergraduate pre-service science teachers. Class size dur-
ing the five years has ranged from 4 to 15. Given the pervasiveness of 
conservative religious commitment among the students, many of the 
students came to the class with grave concerns about teaching evolu-
tion as well as about how their personal beliefs might be handled in 
this methods class. Additional details about the subjects and the course 
has been provided elsewhere (Scharmann et al. 2005). 
The initial instructional unit was pilot tested and was then re-
peatedly revised based on available data sources and retested with 
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students in implementation Years 2 and 3. The NOS component of the 
course was based on 9 of the 10 tenets listed above (all but #7 osten-
tion), focusing on activities that required students to deal explicitly 
and reflectively with NOS concepts. (Application of each of the 10 te-
nets to the course design will be described in the following section.). 
As expected, and as the course was designed for, the majority of 
students in these courses gave evidence of experiencing disequilib-
rium/cognitive dissonance between their own naïve views of the na-
ture of science and more informed consensus views. Given the ongo-
ing political furor over the science standards of the state in which the 
course is taught, much of the discussion focused on the scientific sta-
tus of evolution and intelligent design. Interviews, electronic email ex-
changes with the course instructor, and regularly assigned response 
papers gave ample evidence that early iterations of the course facil-
itated more informed views of the NOS, even among some students 
who claimed to adhere to conservative Christian theology. In addi-
tion, results from these early iterations of the course supported the 
following conclusions: 
• An understanding of the NOS is enhanced when NOS concepts are 
introduced in an explicit-reflective manner. 
• Any instructional unit designed to introduce NOS concepts must 
be carefully sequenced. 
• Science-religious issues need to surface immediately and be re-
spectfully discussed throughout the duration of the instructional 
unit. 
• When a NOS unit is structured in this manner, students who dem-
onstrate strong religious belief (and anti-evolutionary sentiments) 
at the beginning of the course are less likely to feel threatened and 
more likely to be willing to “cross the border” and at least consider 
views that they previously found to be threatening. (A complete 
description of this iterative, action research agenda was published 
earlier. See Scharmann et al. 2005.) 
7. Current Course Structure: Implementations 4–5 
Beginning with the 2004 course, we sought to further enhance 
the course by directly integrating the previously described work on 
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learning by ostention. As with earlier versions, the revised NOS unit 
was organized as an extended “5-E” learning cycle inquiry unit-plan 
(Dougherty 1997) (Tenet #10). Instruction focused explicitly on en-
hancing student understanding of the NOS (Tenets #2 and #3) and 
required active cognitive engagement with NOS issues (Tenet #4). 
Learning activities required students to generate criteria that can be 
used to evaluate the scientific status of a statement (Tenet #8), and 
readings and instructor guidance during class discussions and elec-
tronic mail exchanges focused student thinking on aspects of consen-
sus informed views of the NOS (Tenet #1). The NOS unit provided 
multiple opportunities for reflection and justifications for judgments 
of intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness (Tenet #5) and provided 
subsequent opportunities to apply NOS concepts to judgments about 
concepts and issues relevant to both in-school and out-of-school set-
tings (Tenet #6). Every effort was made by the instructor, both im-
plicitly and explicitly, to respect the religious views of the students 
and to establish an atmosphere in which students did not feel threat-
ened – where they were encouraged to feel at ease and where they 
could make low-risk attempts to understand various claims (Tenet 
#9). Activities involving learning by ostention were included through-
out the course as described below. Features of the most recent iter-
ation of the NOS instructional unit (enrollment 15) included the fol-
lowing: Engagement (10 minutes). Three activities were designed to 
promote learning NOS concepts by ostention (Tenet #7). The first os-
tention activity was employed as part of the “engagement” phase of 
the learning cycle (see Figure 1). In this activity students were asked 
to individually consider pairs of terms and to determine which mem-
ber of each pair was the “more scientific.” This first set of item pairs 
was constructed to present the most prototypical examples of science 
and non-science so that the “more scientific” choice could be easily 
identified. Students unanimously chose the member of each pair con-
sistent with informed views of the NOS with one exception. The pair 
that proved to be the most difficult choice was that of “Ecology – Man-
agement” (with Management being selected as more scientific by 5 of 
the 15 students). Through class discussion students related that they 
were unsure whether the term “management” was being used here 
to refer to business or to refer to science-related fields such as wild-
life or range management. This result was unexpected but gave evi-
dence that the activity had achieved our purposes of promoting active 
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cognitive engagement with NOS concepts (Tenet #4) and demonstrat-
ing the commonality of views about the scientific status of these ex-
amples (part of Tenet #7). The difficulty students had with the “ecol-
ogy – management” pair also had the positive effect of demonstrating 
to students that it can be difficult to categorize a term or concept as 
scientific or non-scientific when the term is used out of context. 
7.1. Exploration (30 Minutes) 
In the second student task, somewhat less prototypical pairs of 
terms/concepts were presented – cases in which determining the rel-
ative scientific status of each term might be more controversial (e.g., 
astrology – astronomy; see Figure 2.) In order to introduce the con-
cept of a continuum between science and non-science, in four cases a 
single term was paired with two others, one of which it was likely to 
be judged as more scientific and the other, less scientific. In our view, 
introducing students to the view that some ideas are more scientific 
than others is a primary instructional tool “easing border crossings,” 
putting students at ease and showing the possibility of flexibility and 
respectful well-reasoned disagreement between individuals, even in-
cluding students and the instructor (Tenet #9). This nonconfronta-
tional atmosphere was further promoted in this second student ac-
tivity by the purposeful inclusion of pairs of terms (e.g., intelligent 
design – reincarnation) in which one member of the pair is a term 
whose legitimacy some students are likely to have a personal invest-
ment in is contrasted with a term that can appropriately be catego-
rized as less scientific. Students find the inclusion of such pairs both 
surprising and liberating. 
Figure 1. NOS Task 1.  
1.Consider each of the following paired terms and circle the one you would 
consider to be the “more scientific.” 
Drama——Physics 
Mechanics——Literature 
Music——Chemistry 
Biology——Religion 
Ecology——Management 
History——Geology 
2.Which pair(s) caused you the most difficulty? 
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Individuals again categorized the members of each pair as “more 
scientific” and or “less scientific.” Students then selected a partner 
and attempted to achieve a consensus categorization for each pair of 
terms. Our purpose here was not only was to illustrate how science 
is socially constructed (consistent with a constructivist instructional 
model – Tenet #4) but also to also provide opportunities for reflection 
and require students to justify their judgments on grounds of intelli-
gibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness (Tenet #5) – just as scientists de-
velop criteria to assist in determining what counts as evidence or as 
individuals (outside of school) must make reasoned judgments about 
the relative scientific merits of various claims. 
7.2. Explanation (80 Minutes) 
Next the instructor (second author) guided students in whole-class 
discussion to come to a social consensus on NOS criteria used by all 
student teams as a basis for judging terms in the activities as more 
or less scientific. Criteria constructed by the students included the 
Figure 2. NOS Task 2.  
1.Individually, consider each of the following paired terms. Circle the term that 
appears to be the “more scientific” of the two. (Note: where a term is repeated 
you should consider it only with the term with which it is independently 
paired). 
Optics – Music 
Reflexology – Acupuncture 
Sociology – Advertising 
Neurology –Acupuncture 
Political Science – Psychology 
Engineering – Military Science 
Genetics – Computer Science 
Engineering – Astrophysics 
Channeling – Iridology 
Theology – Education 
Intelligent Design – Reincarnation 
Biochemistry – Education 
Astrology – Astronomy 
Philosophy – Palmistry 
Philosophy – Economics 
2.Now examine your list with your partner(s). Develop a consensus list.  
3. List below those criteria that you used to make your decisions. 
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following: More scientific fields of study make claims that are testable 
(can be subjected to “if → then” reasoning), repeatable/verifiable, ob-
servable, measurable (quantifiable), and can lead to the development 
and testing of models. Students were then asked to test the validity 
of their socially constructed criteria on a third task in which pairs of 
students examined pairs of statements to determine which of the two 
statements (i.e., knowledge claims) was more reflective of science. 
Students were explicitly instructed to make these judgments based on 
their newly developed criteria (see Figure 3). Student pairs made their 
judgments and reported their decisions to the group. All student teams 
made judgments consistent with informed NOS views and gained ex-
perience applying consensus criteria for making these judgments. 
The instructor then led students through an introduction to the Na-
tional Science Education Standards (National Research Council 1996) 
with specific reference to Content Standard G (“History and Nature 
of Science,” pp. 200–204) which describes (a) science as a human en-
deavor, (b) nature of scientific knowledge, and (c) historical perspec-
tives. Finally, students were asked to complete a nature of science quiz 
(Chiappetta and Koballa 2004) comprised of twelve T/F items based 
on statements from the National Science Education Standards. Student 
responses at this point in the course ranged from as few as four items 
to as many as nine items correct (33–75%; mean=50%). 
7.3. Elaboration (6 Hours) 
Prior to each of the next three class sessions, students were asked 
to read two articles that focused explicitly on the NOS (Evening 1 – 
Smith and Scharmann 1999; Clough and Olson 2004; Evening 2 – Niaz 
2001; Scharmann and Smith 2001; Evening 3 – Somerville 1941; Pe-
terson 2002). Students were requested to submit individual reflective 
essays for each of the readings, comparing the views of the authors 
both with the criteria developed in class and with those tenets listed 
in Content Standard G of the National Science Education Standards 
(National Research Council 1996). The instructor provided written it-
erative feedback to individual students between sessions. In addition, 
the instructor led class discussions based on critical issues raised by 
students in their reflective essays and also provided three inquiry ac-
tivities (Black Boxes, “Humdingers,” and Uncalibrated Thermometers) 
as detailed in our previous manuscript (Scharmann et al. 2005). 
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Figure 3. NOS Task 3.
1. With your partner(s), read each pair of statements below. 
2. For each pair of statements, identify one statement that is MORE reflective of 
science and one that is LESS reflective of science. 
3. Justification: Explain how you made your decision for each pair. What is/are 
the main characteristic(s)/criteria that distinguish(es) the two members of 
each pair? 
A. If you break a mirror, you will have seven years of bad luck 
B. If hair color is inherited, then identical twin should have the same 
hair color. 
C. Humans have a soul. 
D. The rate of acceleration of all falling objects on earth is constant. 
E. The rate of acceleration of an object due to the influence of the 
earth’s gravity is 9.8 meters per second per second. 
F. If you dream of tea, someone will die. This actually happened to me 
once. 
G. Scientists in the 18th century believed that acquired traits (like 
musical performance ability) were inherited. Research data later 
showed this to be largely false. 
H. Some people believe that the earth is flat because it looks flat to 
them. They are not willing to consider other data such as pictures of 
the earth taken from space. 
I. If HIV causes AIDS, then every person with AIDS should have the vi-
rus in their body. 
J. Humans today are the reincarnations of people in the past. 
K. Astrology is the prediction of the future from the stars. Astrology 
has not led to new hypotheses and other areas of study. 
L. Genetics is a fertile new science that has led to many new hypothe-
ses and new area of study. 
M. Some people believe that placing magnets on parts of the body that 
hurt will cure the problem. They are unwilling to consider the possi-
bility that they could be wrong. 
N. Experiments in psychology are often replicated because psycholo-
gists recognize that the conclusions of earlier experiments could be 
wrong. 
O. In 1989, researchers reported that they had been able to perform 
cold fusion -- a process widely thought by others to be impossible. 
Many people did not believe the researchers until they saw the data 
themselves. 
P. A parapsychologist “reads the mind” of another person. The audi-
ence is awed by the parapsychologist’s skill. 
Q. If the Koran says it is so, it is so. 
R. Many scientists do not believe that Vitamin C will prevent the com-
mon cold even though Linus Pauling, the Nobel laureate who discov-
ered the structure of Vitamin C, claimed it will. 
S. I believe that God loves me 
T. The average IQ in the freshman class is over 100.  
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7.4. Evaluation (4 Hours) 
Three culminating activities were provided and the NOS quiz (Chi-
appetta and Koballa 2004) was re-administered to represent the “eval-
uation” phase of the unit-plan learning cycle. The first two activities 
were performance based. 
7.4.1. Activity 1 – Teaching a NOS-based Lesson 
In the first activity teams of students prepared and taught an explicit 
NOS based lesson plan. Students selected lessons from among those 
provided in Chapter 6 “Activities for Teaching about Evolution and the 
Nature of Science” from Teaching about Evolution and the Nature of 
Science (National Academy of Sciences 1998). (Note: Each of these pub-
lished activities is written as a 5-E learning cycle lesson plan.) 
7.4.2. Activity 2 – The Final NOS Continuum 
The second activity asked students to place evolution, intelligent 
design, and “umbrellaology” (Somerville 1941) along a less-to-more 
scientific continuum and then to justify in writing their decisions 
based on accepted criteria. This activity (replicated from our previ-
ous action research – see Scharmann et al. 2005) requires students 
to analyze and synthesize the readings provided during the unit and 
encourages the consolidation of their personal views of the nature of 
science in the context of this most difficult task. All fifteen students, 
four of whom continued to identify themselves as religious conserva-
tives [2 are cited case studies below] placed evolution as “most sci-
entific;” thirteen placed “umbrellaology” as intermediate and intel-
ligent design as “least scientific,” and two reversed the placement of 
the latter two fields of study. The unanimity of the placement of evo-
lution as “most scientific” was surprising given that two students (to 
be discussed below) began the unit by either a flat rejection of evo-
lution or at least a rejection of the “macro” evolutionary theory. We 
had erroneously assumed that students who reject evolution would 
not recognize the theory as scientific. This ability of students to rec-
ognize evolution as scientific while at the same time rejecting the the-
ory is a crucial finding because such recognition can serve as a prime 
entry point for instruction with these students. 
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7.4.3. Activity 3 – NOS Quiz Post-administration 
At the close of the NOS unit, student responses ranged from a low 
of 8 to a high of 12 items correct (67–100%; mean=79%). Thus, over 
the 5-week span of the NOS unit the lowest student scores doubled 
from the pretest and the class mean increased by nearly 30%. 
8. Insights from Selected Case Studies 
Three cases are presented below to illustrate the process of con-
ceptual change that occurred for selected individuals over the course 
of the NOS instructional unit. All three individuals were students who 
claimed a very conservative Christian heritage and for whom evolu-
tion was not a legitimate scientific theory. [Note: the use of “T” in 
the transcripts below refers to teacher comments back to students 
via electronic mail.] 
8.1. Case 1: Dale 
Dale was raised on a farm in a small midwestern community. She 
graduated with a major in agricultural education. She has taught high 
school agriculture for the past three years in a small rural town. Dale 
enrolled in the Laboratory Techniques class for the purpose of try-
ing to complete a teaching minor in biological sciences so that she 
can offer agriculture classes for science credit. (Note: In many Mid-
western states agricultural courses can substitute for standard sci-
ence offerings at the secondary school level if the agriculture teacher 
also is licensed to teach one of the sciences). Dale’s first electronic ex-
change with the instructor began with a carefully couched rejection 
of evolution: 
Dale: “As an instructor and having not taught a unit on evolution, I 
believe that I would have trouble keeping my personal beliefs out 
of the classroom regardless of my efforts to do so. However, if I 
were comparing evolution and creationism by discussing pros and 
cons of both, my students would be able to form their own opin-
ion or belief one way or the other without any hidden curriculum 
involved.” 
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T: “Unfortunately, the issue surrounding an inclusion of creationism 
or intelligent design in a science classroom is far more compli-
cated. While it may be tempting to include it “out of fairness” to 
assist students in making up their own minds, doesn’t it carry 
with it the assumption that students will find creationism a com-
pelling argument?” 
Dale: “If we present the facts and information in an unbiased manner 
then we are allowing the students to begin that decision-making 
process using an experienced-based learning process. What bet-
ter way for students to learn?” 
T: “Might we also need to worry about a different issue – that your 
approach might cause a student to reject their own religious val-
ues because one chooses to include intelligent design?” 
Dale: “Probably wouldn’t happen. Don’t know. I personally believe in 
creationism, but evolution might fill in some holes.” 
T: “I appreciate your honesty in admitting that you believe in creation-
ism yet accept certain aspects of evolution. It has been my intent 
of twenty plus years to point out the power of scientific theories 
as problem- solving tools without implying that science has a cor-
ner on the market in solving ALL problems.” Midway through the 
NOS unit, Dale takes a different tack in describing how one theory 
“fills in the holes” of another. 
Dale: “As I have stated before, I believe intelligent design or creation-
ism but accept different aspects of evolution. To that I would now 
add that natural selection does take place and has probably taken 
place since the beginning of time. This article (Peterson 2002) dis-
cusses intelligent design and evolution. Scientifically neither idea 
is perfect ... both have gaps. I would now agree that intelligent 
design fills in several holes that the theory of evolution has, but 
would also argue that evolution does the same for intelligent de-
sign. This article was extremely confusing.” 
T: “I hope that you realize that I am not purposely trying to confuse 
you.” 
Dale: “This is not the best article I have read comparing evolution and 
intelligent design.” 
T: “Is it because the article is written by a conservative theological 
scholar who is openly critical of intelligent design?” 
Dale: “No ... it just confuses me more.” 
S m i t h  &  S c h a r m a n  i n  S c i e n c e  &  E d u c at i o n  1 7  ( 2 0 0 8 )       24
At the close of the NOS instructional unit, Dale cedes some points 
concerning what makes one scientific theory “more scientific” than 
another. Although she is still in minor cognitive dissonance, she now 
places evolution above (if only barely above) intelligent design along 
the continuum. 
Dale: “Since evolution has been studied the theory has changed to 
some degree and as new information becomes available I am sure 
that it will change again allowing for self-correction. Skepticism is 
always a factor in science and especially in evolutionary science. 
People are extremely skeptical of evolution because it does not 
agree with what they learned in church and growing up. If evolu-
tion is true, then is there a God or higher being? Evolution is more 
of a scientific theory than intelligent design, however, depending 
on who you ask it may or may not meet enough of the criteria to 
be a good scientific theory. I would say it is a science theory, how-
ever, it has many limitations.” 
8.2. Case 2: Alexis 
Alexis was raised in a small mid-western city to accept a literal in-
terpretation of biblical scripture. She holds a B.S. degree in mathe-
matics education and is currently a Masters degree candidate in Cur-
riculum and Instruction. Instead of teaching in a public school setting 
after college graduation from undergraduate studies, Alexis chose to 
work in a private secondary Christian school where she has taught 
mathematics for the past decade. Alexis was initially hesitant to en-
roll in the Laboratory Techniques class because of concern that evo-
lution is addressed in the NOS unit. 
Alexis: “The AAWOK [‘as-a-way-of-knowing’] topic was of particular 
interest to me because of the distinction between knowing scien-
tifically and knowing religiously. I must admit that the portions 
concerning evolution were difficult to read. I do believe that God 
created the heavens and the earth, the earth is not as old as car-
bon dating or other measures would indicate, and creation is based 
upon the word of God (omniscient and unfailing) not of man (Dar-
win). My faith in God supersedes my faith in science in certain 
areas.” 
S m i t h  &  S c h a r m a n  i n  S c i e n c e  &  E d u c at i o n  1 7  ( 2 0 0 8 )       25
T: “I had a sense that this section might cause you some difficulty.” 
Alexis: “I guess I got off on a tangent. As a math educator, this article 
(Smith and Scharmann 1999) was helpful in giving me an overview 
of what science is and isn’t (or more appropriately what is more 
scientific and less scientific). I see some similarities to the “na-
ture of mathematics” especially in the use of language and want-
ing students to take their mathematical knowledge to make bet-
ter, more informed decisions.” 
T: “You clearly have little to fear by taking the course and are very se-
cure in your personal faith. My object ... is simply to assist students 
to see how a theory (such as evolution) is capable of solving prob-
lems, making predictions about which we can generate hypothe-
ses, and providing a logical explanation consistent with patterns in 
present evidence. Science theories do not promote ultimate truths.” 
Midway through the NOS unit, Alexis makes a startling discovery 
(or has a personal epiphany) concerning the difference between prox-
imate (i.e., scientific) and absolute (i.e., theological) truths. 
Alexis: “I had never contemplated the difference between truth and 
scientific truth. This is why I had difficulty grasping the idea of a 
scientific theory; I thought it was absolute truth. And in the case 
of evolution, I don’t believe it as absolute truth so I couldn’t see 
it as a tool. My thought process was incorrect. This is so hard for 
me to say because IDT [Intelligent Design Theory] is so appeal-
ing to me. Although I have made progress on the whole theory is-
sue, I still need to remind myself that less scientific does not mean 
worse or wrong thinking.” 
T: “Right – scientific theories can NEVER be absolute truth. They cease 
to work in solving problems if they did become absolute truth. And, 
it is not that your thought processes were incorrect so much as less 
informed concerning the nature of science.” 
Alexis: “The line that makes the most sense to me is: “Extraordinary 
claims require extraordinary evidence.” And even though IDT sits 
well with me, I cannot deny this statement. ID theorists have not 
produced extraordinary evidence to support their claims.” 
Finally, at the close of the NOS instructional unit, Alexis now 
strongly places evolution as more scientific in comparison to 
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intelligent design and even considers umbrellaology stronger scien-
tifically than intelligent design. It appears that her “Aha!” recognition 
of the difference between absolute and proximate causes has had a 
profound influence on her thinking. 
Alexis: “I had minimal experience with NOS thinking – it was very eye-
opening. It is still hard for me to separate science, truth, and be-
lief. Intelligent Design (ID), however, is not a science because it is 
not theologically neutral, values God over physical evidence, and 
relies on faith. ID is not repeatable, fairly rigid in belief, not open-
minded, somewhat illogical to believe, and is a “messy” theory. 
ID meets fewer criterions for being a science than umbrellaology. 
T: “How does evolution fit in comparison?” 
Alexis: “It pains me to say that evolution is a good theory based on 
the criteria for science. It is empirical, testable, repeatable, fallible, 
and self-correcting. The theory also possesses large explanatory 
power, predictability, presents new questions of study, relatively 
simple to understand, logical, and skeptical (repeatedly tested). I 
can’t believe I just wrote this.” 
8.3. Case 3: Jesse 
Jesse is a traditional undergraduate science education student ma-
joring in chemistry with mathematics as a teaching minor. Jesse, like 
Dale, was raised in a rural, agriculturally-based community, where 
being a member of the community equates with strong affiliation 
with conservative Christian values. Jesse enrolled in the Laboratory 
Techniques class because it was a required course for graduation/li-
censure; but, unlike students from similar backgrounds, it was clear 
from the first day of class that he had looked forward to the course 
experiences. His e-mails suggest that Jesse was searching for affir-
mation of personal conceptual change that he had constructed prior 
to his class enrollment. 
Jesse: “I agree that the science teacher should not be an “evangelist,” 
rather the teacher is a facilitator of student understanding and an 
encourager of student discovery and inquiry. Personally, I was sat-
isfied to both hear from the instructor’s mouth and read his words 
that he is not interested in fostering an environment of persuasion 
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or manipulation to a certain point of view. I am pleased that the fo-
cus of this class is learning, and I am grateful the instructor prac-
tices what he preaches.”  
T: “Thanks for noticing. Someone who teaches a ‘methods of teach-
ing’ class has a special obligation to foster instructional models 
one hopes their graduates will use. So, you found the NOS contin-
uum activities valuable?” 
Jesse: “We engaged in fruitful discussions that allowed each of us to 
voice our reasoning without being divided into camps. As an ac-
tive participant in the learning exercises, I can honestly say I am 
convinced that the approach [suggestions for teaching NOS found 
in Smith & Scharmann (1999)] is an effective method to help stu-
dents learn the foundational issues in the NOS while avoiding un-
productive arguments over whether an area is or is not a science.” 
At this point it was clear that Jesse was a careful and thoughtful 
learner but also that he was withholding his personal NOS positions 
until he witnessed consistency in the instructor’s approach. Although 
it appears that he wanted to trust the instructor, he did not make his 
opinions clear until the mid-point of the unit: 
Jesse: “I will not hesitate to say that my heart wants IDT to be shown 
as scientific as evolutionary theory. Moreover, I would like it to 
be true. Philosophy aside, I recognize that in its current state, IDT 
provides a weak explanation (at best) as a competing theory for 
the origin of species and no explanation as a breakthrough the-
ory proving the existence of God. I am comfortable acknowledg-
ing that man may never be able to provide a scientific basis for the 
existence of God. In fact, it even makes sense to me – If God had 
intended His existence to be shown through hard facts, data, and 
theory, why would it be necessary to have faith?” 
T: “It appears that you had come to a conclusion on this issue before 
taking this class. Is that the case?” 
Jesse: “I did have some of these thoughts, but didn’t have the language 
to support my ideas. However, as a result of this class, I do now.” 
T: “Thus, although you find IDT emotionally compelling, it is logi-
cally weak?” 
Jesse: “In other words, the payoff of IDT is NOT increased scien-
tific knowledge but rather relief from the attempt to answer 
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unanswerable questions. The lack of curiosity about the ID theo-
rists’ own theory is remarkable – besides it lacks predictive power 
of explanation for natural phenomena.” 
T: “And evolution by comparison?” 
Jesse: “Evolution as a theory – the NOS as a whole – appears to be 
unbiased and objective (even if some of its proponents are not).” 
T: “So you can separate the enterprise of science from the individual 
scientist?” 
Jesse: “The enterprise of science takes no theological position, whereas 
the individual scientist always has such a choice.” 
T: “Pretty sophisticated for a 21-year old.” 
Jesse: “Thanks.” 
9. Further Reflections on Case Studies 
At the beginning of the course Dale, Jesse, and Alexis rejected evo-
lution as a valid scientific theory. At the end of the instructional unit, 
however, all three accepted the viability of evolutionary theory but 
with differing levels of emotional response and intellectual under-
standing. Dale, for example, expressed additional confusion and al-
most angrily recognized a need to reconsider an issue she thought 
she had already worked out for herself. In constructing her “less-to-
more” scientific diagram for evolution, ID, and Umbrellaology at the 
end of the instructional unit, she placed evolution only barely above 
the other two (all three tending toward the middle of the continuum). 
In contrast, at the end of the unit both Jesse and Alexis placed evolu-
tion on the far right (as most scientific), ID on the far left (least sci-
entific) and Umbrellaology squarely in the middle. 
Jesse initially stated that he was looking for a means to express 
his thinking in new ways, while Alexis and Dale were not – the issue 
of evolution and faith already having been settled both intellectually 
and emotionally. Yet, while Jesse found additional emotional content-
ment, Dale reports frustration and Alexis experiences a personal in-
tellectual triumph. 
Of the three individuals, Alexis’ NOS understanding has clearly 
come the farthest. She initially told the instructor she didn’t even 
want to take the course because she was afraid her personal beliefs 
would conflict with the NOS instruction. Post-instruction, however, 
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she exhibited a profound clarity in her use of the concepts of proxi-
mate and ultimate cause (or “absolute truth” in her words) at the con-
clusion of the unit. Dale remained uncertain about these concepts. 
Jesse seems to have found the necessary language he was initially 
seeking to express a rather sophisticated NOS understanding, much 
of which be brought into the class. 
10. Summary and Closing Remarks 
This paper presents the philosophical and research underpinnings 
for an instructional unit on the nature of science that is taught as one 
of four major themes of a science methods course at a university in a 
Midwestern state in the U.S. A set of ten tenets that form the unified 
foundation of the unit is presented. The history of the development of 
this course over a period of five years has also been presented along 
with a detailed description of the current structure of the course. The 
major alteration to earlier iterations has been the inclusion of osten-
tion activities throughout the course. Analysis of both qualitative and 
limited quantitative data from students in the course has been prom-
ising, and this work is presented in the hope that others responsible 
for designing NOS instruction will find it helpful. The generalizabil-
ity of our findings is, of course, limited by factors including our lim-
ited class sizes, limited use of quantitative research design, and the 
unique characteristics of our students, but we feel strongly that our 
methods are likely to be effective in other settings, particularly with 
students with strong religious/cultural beliefs that oppose informed 
views of the nature of science. 
Experience presenting the course in the past five years has con-
vinced us of the necessity for each of the ten instructional tenets, 
many of which have been advocated by other researchers (e.g., ex-
plicit reflective NOS instruction, using conceptual change and active 
learning/constructivist methods for teaching NOS, etc.). Two of the 
primary components of our course design, however, have not been ex-
plicitly applied to NOS instruction in any published account: (1) teach-
ing for learning by ostention, and (2) viewing the rejection of naïve 
NOS views for the adoption of more informed views as a (sometimes 
impenetrable) cultural border that must be accounted for in instruc-
tional design. 
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First, we suspect that using ostention activities to promote NOS 
learning may be wise because students are more experienced, and 
therefore may be more comfortable and adept, with this method for 
learning concepts in their everyday world. Second and more impor-
tantly, learning by ostention may result in advancing student un-
derstanding of the nature of science, as evidenced in the case stud-
ies presented here. Like Kuhn’s “Johnny” learning from his father to 
distinguish waterfowl by ostention, our course design makes exten-
sive use of examples. Throughout our course, students are repeat-
edly presented with pairs of example terms and/or claims and are 
asked to categorize each term/claim as more or less scientific com-
pared to the other member of the pair, followed by class discussion 
and consensus building. The pairs are selected so as to be increas-
ingly more conceptually challenging and to involve more significant 
personal beliefs. This sequencing ensures that students develop stan-
dards for judging “more scientific” from “less scientific” and gain ex-
pertise in applying those standards before they are asked make judg-
ments likely to be clouded by strongly held personal commitments. In 
keeping with Kuhn’s pedagogical prescriptions and as Schwartz and 
Bransford (1998) suggest, we find that these activities provide stu-
dents with the ability to identify for themselves in personally mean-
ingful and fruitful ways the distinctive characteristics of the contrast-
ing classes – in this case, science and non-science. We find that this 
instructional design provides a scaffolding that is conducive to radi-
cal conceptual change about the NOS. In the words of Schwartz and 
Bransford, learning by ostention provides the learner with “the differ-
entiated knowledge structures necessary to understand a subsequent 
explanation at a deep level” (p. 504). And “deep learning” about the 
NOS is our holy grail. 
Third, we believe that perhaps too much attention has been focused 
in the NOS pedagogy literature on the cognitive demands of NOS un-
derstanding, and too little attention has been paid to the need for an 
appreciation that students with radically different views of the na-
ture of science (often concomitant with strongly held conservative re-
ligious beliefs) might best be viewed as citizens of radically disparate 
countries with diametrically opposed worldviews (Cobern 1991). For 
many of these individuals, merely considering an attempt to under-
stand the basic tenets of theories held by “the other camp” is asking 
that student to “cross a border” that is greatly feared (Aikenhead and 
S m i t h  &  S c h a r m a n  i n  S c i e n c e  &  E d u c at i o n  1 7  ( 2 0 0 8 )       31
Jegede 1999). Persons crossing that border may not only risk the loss 
of personal identity but may also risk becoming a traitor to oneself 
and the people they love. This is indeed much to ask of a student who 
must spend the rest of his life in that world outside the classroom. 
Abd-El-Khalick and Akerson (2004) explicitly share our concern 
for students that harbor conflicting worldviews, but they identify few 
specific components of their pedagogy aimed to address these con-
cerns and call for others to add their efforts in “the task of translat-
ing Aikenhead and Jegede’s work “into curricular outcomes and in-
structional practices” (p. 807). Our NOS unit pays careful attention 
to “easing border crossings” called for by Aikenhead and Jegede in 
at least three ways. (1) In every course activity, in all course materi-
als, in every class discussion, and in every e-mail from the instructor, 
the students’ beliefs and personhood are honored and a comfortable, 
non-confrontational atmosphere is maintained. Students are allowed 
to hold their own views of the nature of science as long as they have 
confronted the course readings and learning activities in ways that in-
clude examination of their personal NOS views and reasoned justifi-
cation for those views based on criteria achieved through social con-
sensus building in which they have fully participated. The instructor 
explicitly tells the students that he will neither attack their values nor 
demand that they discard their faith and principles. (2) This person-
ally supportive atmosphere encourages Aikenhead and Jegede’s (1999) 
“flexibility and feeling at ease” and Lugones’ (1987) “playfulness.” In 
this setting students feel safe to “bend a little.” They can “open the 
door and peek inside” the other world without personal risk. Reflec-
tion papers provide a particularly safe avenue for students to “try on” 
new NOS understandings and see how these ideas fit with the rest of 
their cognitive, personal, and cultural ecologies and self concepts. The 
“Umbrellaology” activity especially provides this safe context in which 
to be “playful” and an opportunity to develop NOS understanding in a 
non-emotionally laden context. Ensuring that most of the interchanges 
between the instructor and each student are private and confidential 
further enhances this student sense of freedom, ease, and flexibility. 
Fourth, we believe that students are put at ease, are less defensive, 
when science is treated as a continuum more than as an absolute di-
chotomy. In our earlier work (Smith and Scharmann 1999), we pro-
posed that teachers using the continuum approach “should attempt to 
teach students how to use ... [science] descriptors to judge the relative 
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merits of knowledge claims instead of teaching a set of rules that at-
tempt to demarcate science completely from nonscience” (Smith and 
Scharmann 1999, p. 493). Thus, all of our NOS course materials and 
activities are carefully selected/designed to demonstrate that the in-
structor does not hold a black-and-white view of the nature of sci-
ence, which gives the student the freedom to find his/her own “place 
to stand” within the continuum of views without being forced to ei-
ther adopt or reject opposing views en masse. 
As Aikenhead and Jegede (1999) also noted, feeling at ease requires 
in addition 
 
 “(a) being a fluent speaker, (b) agreeing with the norms of 
that culture, (c) being humanly bonded with people in that 
culture, and (d) having a sense of shared history” (p. 273). 
Thus, although the criteria for distinguishing more scientific claims 
from less scientific claims are generated by the students, the instruc-
tor provides them with the standard language used by science educa-
tors to describe the consensus characteristics of the NOS (e.g., tenta-
tiveness, replicability, fruitfulness, etc.). Skill at using this language 
is developed throughout the course in settings that carry low risk of 
embarrassment, including reaction papers with written feedback and 
private electronic mail exchanges. Thus, the student acquires the tools 
required to become “a fluent speaker” about the NOS and thus can ar-
gue cogently for his/her views in this domain. Likewise, in the person 
of the instructor, the authors of course readings, and sometimes even 
other students, students may also become “humanly bonded” with sci-
entists and others who espouse more informed NOS views and thus, 
through the course of instruction, develop a “sense of shared history” 
with them. Perhaps even more importantly, learning that many sci-
entists are believers and that many religious leaders do not reject sci-
ence introduces many students to totally new views of the “norms” of 
both science and non-science cultures. This new understanding rede-
fines what those norms are, allowing some students for the first time 
to consider adopting those norms. 
Fifth, this study reinforced our appreciation of the necessity for 
NOS instructors to set an accepting, respectful, and nonjudgmental 
tone in both formal class activities and private responses to individ-
ual students. In previous iterations of the course students such as Dale 
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often withdrew entirely from class participation if voicing their opin-
ions created an argument during class, but the current course design 
makes it unlikely that such negative reactions will occur. Students in 
this study were more likely to be open to entertaining new NOS un-
derstandings in a setting that was non-confrontational, respected their 
personal beliefs, provided individualized intellectual and emotional 
scaffolding, and provided them with a temporary place to stand along 
a continuum instead of a dichotomy of right and wrong. We believe 
that such a non-threatening climate is essential for enhancing NOS 
understanding among students for whom more appropriate views of 
the nature of science represent a cultural border crossing. This ap-
proach eases such border crossings because it allows students to ad-
vance their NOS understanding more gradually along a continuum. If 
students such as Dale perceive the learning environment as rejecting 
their views and as disrespectful of them as persons, their withdrawal 
may be complete – an opportunity to gain insights into the power and 
limits of science as a way of knowing lost, potentially forever. 
Finally, we concur with the many standards-setting bodies across 
the globe that have identified understanding the nature of science as 
a primary goal requisite to effective functioning in the modern world. 
Achieving informed understandings of the complexities of the nature 
of science remains a challenging task for students and for in-service 
and pre-service teachers. Likewise, designing instruction to support 
NOS learning presents science educators with unique challenges. Al-
though early attempts at NOS instruction met with limited success 
and early research was sometimes characterized by philosophical dis-
agreements that were tangential to the pedagogical questions, we be-
lieve that effective approaches based on a growing consensus in the 
science education community, including the course described here, are 
beginning to appear. Refining these instructional methods and deter-
mining effective means for promoting their use in both secondary and 
college settings must be the primary goals for the future. 
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